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LEGISLATORS LESS FAITH in the judg-HAVE 
ment and business acumen of librarians than they have in that of 
members of a newer profession, the city managers. While the city 
manager is answerable to the council and generally is regarded as 
its business manager, his statutory powers may include the power to 
make appointments and to exercise general supervision over the 
administrative affairs of the municipality. The librarian, who stands 
traditionally in the position of business manager for the library board, 
usually is clothed with no such statutory grant of powers. 
In specifying the lines of control and internal management of 
American libraries, most statutes give full powers to a board of library 
trustees. Some library laws do not mention the librarian at all; '9 
others take passing notice of him by including, among the powers 
of the trustees, the power to select "other necessary officers and 
employes" or to appoint "a suitable librarian and assistants." Even 
in the statutes which describe the power of appointment in terms 
more compatible with the dignity of the profession, there is a notice- 
able absence of reference to the powers and duties of the librarian 
himself. This has been deliberate. To have given him statutory powers 
and duties would have placed him, in some respects, beyond the 
control of the board. 
Some think that those who drafted the early library laws expected 
the library board actually to exercise all of the generally enumerated 
powers and to perform the generally enumerated duties: to select and 
purchase books and supplies, to hire and dismiss all of the library's 
employees, to supervise maintenance. Such an expectation would 
not have been unfounded in experience: these are the things library 
boards often did while librarianship was developing as a profession 
and still must do in the tiny village with the half-day-Monday-Wed- 
nesday-and-Friday-library, or, occasionally, in the larger community 
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when the time comes to dispose of an incompetent librarian. I t  is 
doubtful, however, that even among early legislators any but the 
most uninformed and cautious was thinking in terms of actual trustee 
management. Then, and now, management and control by the board 
meant policy regulation and control of management, the seeing that 
things were done, not the doing of them. 
The division of administrative and policy-making duties between 
librarian and board has universal acceptance. The question of its 
legality seldom arises. Disputes growing out of the practice have 
been personality and administrative conflicts, not disputes over the 
law. Busy-body Board vs. Hamstrung Librarian, or Enlightened Board 
vs. Incompetent Librarian: if these were suits at law rather than 
political or administrative contests, the librarian, good or bad, would 
always lose. As against the board, he has neither legally defined 
powers nor legally defined duties. (Civil Service regulations may 
modify this general rule, as they may affect many of the situations 
discussed in this chapter. The next article treats this more in detail. 
Such regulations must be checked for application to specific circum- 
stances.) 
His role in management, while it has become traditional, is one 
based on sufferance. In his relation to the board he is, with a few 
exceptions, a legal non-entity. He has such duties as the board, his 
conscience, and his fear of public opinion impose on him, and no 
more. He has no statutory powers, and the powers he does exercise 
he exercises by delegation from the board. 
Where statutes are silent, specific definitions of legal powers and 
duties sometimes are supplied by court decision. This is not true in 
the field of internal management of public libraries, for the simple 
reason that conflicts over such powers and duties feature as par-
ticipants the librarian and the board and are resolved, not by court 
action, but by negotiation or a parting of company. The librarian 
whose management policies are wiser than those of the board and 
who has the confidence of the municipal government sometimes can 
force the replacement of his tormenters before they exercise (within 
the limits of local personnel regulations) their absolute right to dis- 
miss him, but it is difficult for a legal non-entity to uphold his non- 
existent powers in court. 
The library profession, and most trustees, accept without question 
the management maxim advising the board to exercise jurisdiction 
over policies and the librarian to assume full administrative control 
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within the library. Management statistics and logic support the propo- 
sition, but directly stated legal justification is more difficult to find. 
If legal justification is needed, it must be based on the general rules 
regulating analagous management functions of private, municipal, 
and quasi-municipal corporations. Application of the analogy is con- 
fused by the fact that in some jurisdictions the functions of the public 
library may be classified as proprietary function^,^ (for the private 
advantage of local inhabitants), in some they may be classed as gov- 
ernmental functions (relating to the general welfare and of interest 
to the state as well as to the local government) and in some the 
question has not been decided. The classification of function is im- 
portant because of the general rule that a municipality acting in its 
proprietary, as distinguished from its governmental capacity, is held 
to the same measure of liability under contract or tort law as a private 
individual or corporation acting under like condition^.^ Until the 
matter has been resolved in the particular jurisdiction it is recom- 
mended that those concerned with library management proceed with 
the caution required of the management of a private corporation. 
Control of a private corporation usually is vested in a board of 
directors, whose functions parallel those of the board of library 
trustees. The relation of the directors to the general manager em-
ployed by them is much like the relation of the librarian to the 
trustees. Like the librarian, the manager is hired to get done the 
things the board wants done (with the purpose of monetary rather 
than public-service return), and the directors delegate to him such 
duties and powers as will allow him to carry on an efficient enterprise. 
The authority to delegate management functions is implied from 
the necessities of efficient administration, but there are certain limits. 
These limits vary with the source of power or function delegated. A 
leading authority on the law of private corporations has classified 
the various kinds of corporate powers, thus aiding the definition of 
proper management activities and providing a starting point for 
determining, in disputes between board and librarian, who has the 
power to administer the library, and in relation to third parties, who 
has the power to enter into agreements concerning administrative 
details. He says that: 
the corporation is bound where the officer or agent exercises any one 
of the following powers: 
1. Powers expressly conferred by a statute, the charter or valid 
bylaws. These are called express powers. 
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2. Powers conferred on particular officers or agents by resolution 
or other express act of the board of directors, where the powers are 
subject to delegation by the board. These powers are also classed as 
express powers. 
3. Powers incidental to the express powers. 
4. Apparent powers, as hereafter defined. 
5. Inherent powers which, however, are in reality one fonn of 
apparent powers, i.e., powers apparent from the very nature of the 
office. Nor is it important whether we call the agent's authority appar- 
ent or implied. 
He acknowledges0 two other classifications noted by the late F. R. 
Mechem in his work on Agency: lo 
6. Powers conferred by custom or usage. 
7. Powers arising in cases of emergency. 
Powers expressly conferred by library laws or charter normally 
belong exclusively to the library board; none of them belongs to 
the librarian. Those affecting internal administration, with which we 
are concerned here, most commonly appear in the statutes as powers 
of supervision over the library's property, employment and control of 
staff, control of finances, control of purchases of library materials, 
supplies, equipment, and the power to adopt such bylaws, rules and 
regulations as the board may deem necessary for the orderly govern- 
ment of the library. Lest something develop not covered by these 
functions, those who draft the laws may provide expressly for one 
which would fall into W. M. Fletcher's third classification, powers 
incidental to the express powers: the power to do all other acts 
necessary for the library's efficient management. The board's statutory 
express powers can be summarized as the power to run the library. 
This cannot be taken from the board except by amendment of the 
statute or charter; part of it can be delegated to committees of the 
board, or to the librarian, but such delegation is a temporary thing, 
not implying an abdication of power. 
Such express functions of the first classification as the librarian can 
claim generally arise, not from the statutes, but from the board's 
bylaws. The extent of his functions varies, of course, with the 
extent of the board's faith in him (or, in some cases of overdue amend- 
ments, with the extent of its faith in his predecessor) but it is usual 
to make the librarian executive director of the board's policies and 
supervisor of the staff. Such broad terms are in the best tradition of 
the well-constructed bylaw. To enumerate specific things the librarian 
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shall do might tend to restrict him to those things only.ll For 
example, a bylaw provision giving the librarian the function of se-
lecting and purchasing books for the library would, by general rules 
of construction, negate his power to select and purchase maps or 
phonograph records. The defect might be remedied by board resolu- 
tion, conferring upon him the second class of express power, but this 
procedure would be subject to the technical objection that simple 
resolution cannot be substituted for a specified and more exacting 
method of bylaw amendment. In the absence of either direct amend- 
ment or empowering resolution, it might be argued that the power 
to purchase maps and phonograph records is incidental to the power 
to purchase books, or that the purchase might be justified as one of 
the librarian's customary powers. There is even authority for the 
proposition that a bylaw can be amended by custom or repealed by 
non-use, or waived.12 As a practical matter, there is the comforting 
thought that deviation from strict construction of the bylaws may be  
unimportant so long as the one for whose protection they are designed 
(here, the board members, and possibly members of the public) 
does not complain that his rights have been violated. As an even 
more practical matter, the amendment of bylaws to substitute general 
for enumerated powers, although a nuisance (as every meeting attend- 
ant knows) is not an insurmountable problem. In the example case 
this would be the method employed by a board which wanted to 
remove all possibility of controversy. 
Even aside from rules governing amendments of bylaws, there is 
a plain principle of efficiency requiring functions of like nature to 
arise from a common source, and not partly from first-thought bylaws 
reinforced by afterthought resolutions. The board's bylaws should 
define, in general terms, the powers of the librarian; resolutions 
should be used only to define methods by which he  shall exercise 
those powers. 
There is an important restriction which applies to both classes of 
express powers, those conferred by the board bylaw and those con- 
ferred by resolution or other express act of the board: they can arise 
only "where the powers are subject to delegation by the b ~ a r d . " ~  
Delegation of powers consumes much of the attention of judges who 
define, and treatise-writers who explain, the law of private and 
municipal corporations. The statement is sometimes made that powers 
which involve the exercise of discretion cannot be delegated; this 
statement is too broad, and is meant to apply to legislative and judicial 
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powers, not to administrative powers. Even if the statute or charter 
by failing to provide for committees or executive librarians gives the 
library board no express power to delegate its functions to others, 
authority so to delegate is implied from necessity and usage; for, 
like the directors of private corporations, the library trustees cannot 
attend to all of the details of library management, and no one expects 
i t  of them.13 
The extent of delegation permitted is limited, however. First, the 
board cannot rid itself of the duty to supervise and control the library 
by delegating all of its functions to the librarian.14 The librarian who 
"runs" the board, who does all of its thinking and makes all of its 
decisions is not clothed thereby with supervisory power. His actions 
are at the board's sufferance, and it can, and probably should, resume 
direct control at  any moment. The board's promise to its librarian 
that it will go along with any suggestions he  makes about library 
affairs is a promise the board has no right to make, and one by which 
it will not be bound if, in an unguarded moment, it does make it. 
Second, the board cannot delegate discretionary powers which are 
vested by statute exclusively in itself.15 For instance, control over 
finances and the power to deal with real property, powers commonly 
given by statute exclusively to the board, cannot be delegated to 
the librarian. This does not mean that the board must itself perform 
all of the ministerial duties connected with these powers, that it 
must keep the library accounts and sign the vouchers and attend to 
all of the details preliminary to conveyances and leases. I t  means 
merely that it must assume responsibility in the final analysis for 
what is done. 
Delegation of authority to the librarian need not be made by formal 
resolution of the board. The "other act" mentioned in Fletcher's second 
classification of express powers may be informal agreement between 
the board and the librarian that he shall perform certain duties 
outside the scope of his every-day functions. 
The board, by ratification, also may affirm the legality of action 
which would be otherwise outside the scope of the librarian's, or an 
individual board member's, or a board committee's authority. This 
has nothing to do with delegation of powers, and may apply to some 
act which is within the non-delegable powers of the board. Thus, 
while the board may have reserved to itself the power to decide upon 
extraordinary purchases (say, single items costing more than a speci- 
fied sum) and the librarian buys a piece of equipment which falls 
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within the extraordinary class, the board may legalize his contract 
by ratification, either by formal resolution or simply by failure to 
disaffirm liability for the purchase price. While the board cannot 
delegate to the librarian or to a committee or to an individual board 
member the power to lease property for a library building, yet if the 
power is exercised illegally by one of them, the board may legalize 
that act by afterwards adopting it and re-executing the lease in 
legal form. 
The third classification of powers, those incidental to the express 
powers, is based on the assumption that the power to do a particular 
act should carry with it the power to do all things naturally and 
ordinarily necessary to accomplish the main purpose. If the librarian 
has the express power of staff supervision by board resolution or  
bylaw, he must have the incidental power to departmentalize staff 
functions, to assign duties, to transfer department heads. The li- 
brarian's incidental powers, like his express and apparent powers, may 
be limited by board action. Those which would be normally incidentaI 
to power conferred by resolution or informal agreement can be limited 
by the same method; for example the board's resolution delegating 
to the librarian the authority to decorate the library with Christmas 
trees during the Christmas season, would normally carry the incidental 
authority to purchase tree ornaments, but that power might be elimi- 
nated by an economy-fathered provision, or separate resolution, di- 
recting use of popcorn strings, or last-year's or borrowed ornaments. 
Technical interpretation would require an amendment of the board's 
bylaws to eliminate powers incidental to bylaw-conferred express 
powers, but practical considerations make it expedient for the li-
brarian to accept, as limitation of his incidental powers, the informal 
expression of the board. 
The next classifications, apparent powers, inherent powers, and 
powers conferred by custom or usage, for most purposes may be 
treated as one. Evidence which tends to show one usually is evidence 
tending to show the others. Apparent powers are those which the 
corporate body, by its action or its failure to act, leads others to 
think it has conferred upon its agent. Inherent powers are those 
which are incidental to the office. Powers conferred by custom or 
usage need no further definition. In determining legal responsibility 
for the library's internal administration, inherent powers are of little 
significance, because the librarian has none and the board, while it 
may have some, does not need to rely upon them for its authority. 
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Apparent powers and powers conferred by custom or usage have no 
significance in disputes between the board and the librarian, because 
the board's power over the librarian is not apparent or customary 
but express, and the board can cut off the librarian's apparent or 
customary powers whenever it sees fit. These types of power do have 
some significance in determining the extent to which third persons 
may rely on agreements made with the librarian. 
A librarian who has no express authority from the board to contract 
for radio publicity under certain conditions may acquire apparent 
authority to make such arrangements, and, in some cases the board 
may be held to the agreement. The most important of these con-
ditions is that the transaction occur in a jurisdiction holding that a 
public library is a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental 
agency, or at least that the transaction in question was made to 
further a proprietary function. It already has been noted that this may 
be difficult to determine. The law is chary of the people's money, 
and the weight of authority is that he who deals with an agency 
charged with a governmental, as against a proprietary function, is 
bound to ascertain the exact extent of the agent's power.16 This would 
negate the existence of apparent authority, and municipalities have 
been held not liable on unauthorized contracts even when the subject 
matter of the contract had been deIivered and completely consumed.17 
If, on the other hand, the contract has been made in a proprietary 
capacity, the board's measure of liability is the same as that of a 
private c~rporation,~ and it may be bound by acts of the librarian it 
has clothed with apparent authority. To be so bound, the board must 
know, or at least not be guilty of negligence in not knowing, that 
the librarian is or has been representing himself as having authority 
to make the agreement. Ordinarily this means that he must have 
made such representations before he made those bringing about the 
transaction in controversy, because a course of conduct often must 
be proved in order to charge the board with knowledge that he was 
exceeding his express or implied authority; but actual knowledge of 
the representations leading up to the agreement in question would 
have the same effect. 
The librarian's air of authority, and the board's knowledge of it, 
are not the only facts which must be proved if the radio station is to 
hold the board to the agreement. The protection of the apparent 
authority rule is extended only to the innocent third person dealing 
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in good faith and relying to his injury on the unauthorized representa- 
tions. This coupled with the requirement of actual or constructive 
knowledge of a librarian's actions embraces all of the elements of 
estoppel, a doctrine which is really a part of the apparent authority 
rule. The salesman who was treated to all the staged evidences of 
the librarian's authority to purchase radio time, but who knew that 
the librarian actually lacked it, meets neither the good faith nor the 
reliance tests, nor would his principal. 
The fact of injury, the last element the vendor must prove in order 
to bind the board, has not been interpreted uniformly in all juris- 
dictions. There seems to be little doubt that the radio station would 
have been lured into what the law calls an injurious change of position 
if the board sought to disavow the contract at the conclusion of the 
series of broadcasts. If the attempted disavowal were to occur before 
the broadcasts had begun, before the library had received any benefit 
under the contract, proof of injury sufficient to support estoppel be- 
comes less certain. Injury should be apparent, certainly, at the point 
at which substitute scheduling of an equally attractive program had 
become impossible. The weight of authority considers the showing 
of a loss of expected profit sufficient (the other elements having been 
proved), and it even has been held that the mere deprivation of the 
benefit of a contract is injurious, without proof that any profit would 
have resulted from it.18 
The extent to which corporate boards have been bound by acts 
within the apparent authority of their agents is enough to justify some 
jitteriness on the part of library trustees. Things are not as bad as 
the cases make them seem, however. The board which finds itself 
unwillingly bound because it has slept through some of the librarian's 
maneuvers, is not bound forever thereafter by its own negligence. 
While it cannot restrict the librarian's apparently-established authority 
by secret resolution or agreement, and there is a question whether it 
can do so by specsc provision in the bylaws,lg it certainly can do so 
by well publicized resolution. The more drastic solution, in all juris- 
dictions, is to fire the librarian. 
The last classification of powers, powers arising in cases of emerg- 
ency, is based on common sense. Cases involving their exercise in 
libraries have not reached the appellate courts, but it seems reasonable 
to assume that the librarian who calls the nearest plumber when a 
broken pipe is flooding the Treasure Room should have the support 
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of the board, even without express or implied power to arrange for 
plumbing service, and even in the face of the board's contract with 
another. 
A discussion of who is the legal boss of the library emphasizes, 
more than actual practice shows, that the librarian's power is ex-
tremely limited. There are restrictions, too, on the board. Their 
power to control the library is made quite definite by statute, and 
legal controversy is more apt to arise over how they exercise their 
powers than over what powers they exercise. Rules of parliamentary 
procedure, sometimes erroneously called parliamentary law, establish 
guides for orderly conduct of their meetings, but some distinction 
should be made between the rules that are aimed only at orderly 
conduct and those which actually delineate the difference between 
legal and illegal action. 
Basic to the board's power is the proposition that it must act as a 
board at a legal meeting, or its action has no legal effect. The statutes 
placing power of management in a specified number of trustees con- 
template management directed by the judgment, counsel, and influ- 
ence of all, and the substitution of the management of individual 
board members acting individually is illegal even when all approve 
the action taken. One of the best explanations for this rule appears 
in Ames v. Goldfield Merger Mines CO.:~O 
"It is fundamental that officers of boards can only act as such consti- 
tuted boards when assembled as such, and by deliberate and concerted 
action dispose of the issue under consideration, and that they cannot 
act in an individual capacity outside of a formal meeting, and a 
majority of the individual expressions be the action of the board. The 
law believes that the greatest wisdom results from conference and 
exchange of individual views, and it is for that reason that the law 
requires the united wisdom of a majority of the several members of 
the hoard in determining the business of a corporation." 
This united wisdom cannot be achieved by proxy. Thus, if less than 
a quorum of the trustees assemble, they can take no action even 
though absent members telephone their assent during the meeting, 
and afterwards sign the minutes.21 The only safe solution is ratifica- 
tion of the intended action at a legal meeting, with a quorum present. 
What constitutes a quorum may be specified in the statute or in 
the board's bylaws. Unless there is specific provision to the contrary, 
a majority of the board's members constitutes a quorum; and a 
majority of the quorum may decide any question coming before the 
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meeting. Statutory language calling for unanimous consent of the 
board or a two-thirds vote of the board to accomplish certain purposes 
has been interpreted generally to mean unanimous vote, or two-
thirds vote, of the quorum present at a legal meeting.22 
The requirement that all members be given notice of the meeting 
is, like the quorum requirement, no mere rule of order, but a basic 
legal requirement, and it is based on the same reasoning. Boards which 
by statute or bylaw meet regularly, the time and place being fixed, 
must concern themselves with this requirement only with regard to 
special meetings. There is some authority for the proposition that a 
quorum of trustees meeting specially and acting by a majority of 
the whole board (not by the usual majority of the quorum) can act 
validly notwithstanding the fact that notice of the meeting was not 
given to absent members. The proponents of this theory argue that 
notice is immaterial since the absent members, even had they been 
present and voted against the action, could not have changed the 
result. However, the better view, and the majority view, is that 
notice must be given to all board members unless the absence or 
inaccessibility of one or more makes it impossible. Just as "the law 
believes that the greatest wisdom results from conference and ex-
change of individual views," so it believes that the lone dissenter, 
had he been given the opportunity to present his views, might have 
been able to persuade the others and thereby change the result. 
What constitutes sufficient notice is ruled by reason and custom 
rather than technicality. If a trustee actually is present at the meeting 
by virtue of accident, the fact that he was not given notice is im- 
material. If the notice is sent to him in a way which should assure a 
reasonable expectancy of his receiving it, and if it contains informa- 
tion about the time and place of the meeting, and gives him sufficient 
time to arrange to be present (this will depend on the customary 
habits of the board members) the fact that he fails to read it may be 
immaterial. Personal notice, by telephone or direct contact, is always 
sufficient provided it is given a reasonable time before the meeting 
and the information is complete 23 and provided the bylaws do not 
require some other method.24 
Just as the board may ratify acts of the librarian performed without 
the scope of his authority, so it may ratify actions by part of its mem- 
bers at an illegal meeting. Ratification is merely the doing over, in 
a proper way, that which has been attempted in an improper way. 
The ratification must be made by the board, acting as a board at a 
MAR IAN  G.  GALLAGHER 
meeting satisfying the quorum and notice requirements, and the 
ratifying vote must be at  least equal to the vote required for the 
original act. Thus, if two-thirds of the board members at  a meeting 
which was illegal because a lone dissenter was not given notice, 
approved an action requiring approval of two-thirds, a majority of 
the board cannot thereafter ratify that action at a meeting otherwise 
legal. The ratification vote also must be a two-thirds vote. 
Other formalities may, by statute or bylaw, be made basic 
to the board's power to act, but in the absence of such statutory 
provision, the board may make decisions and even enter into binding 
contracts by common consent, without formal resolutions or entry 
on the minutes. Minutes are evidence of board action and whether 
particular action is recorded properly, or at  all, does not, in the 
absence of specific provision, affect the validity of that action.25 The 
board that fails to keep an accurate record of its proceedings is 
inefficient, and subject to public censure. I t  may become a board 
whose actions are unpredictable and unreliable because its history 
of precedent and guide for future policy is incomplete. But it cannot 
deny responsibility for decisions duly made, merely because they are 
not recorded in the minutes. 
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